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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Judges Greenwood and Thome

FROM:

Judge Bench

DATE:

November 17,2009

RE:

Soderborg v. Soderborg, Case No. 20080398

This case is scheduled for conferencing on Tuesday November 24,2009. I have attached a
preliminary draft to help with our discussion.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Barbara Soderborg,
Petitioner and Appellant,

Case No. 20080398-CA
F I L E D

0

David S. Soderborg,
Respondent and Appellee

2 0 0 9 UT App XXX {

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 064901622
The Honorable Robert P. Faust
Attorneys;

Grant W.P. Morrison and Matthew G. Morrison, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
Kim M. Luhn and Paul H. Liapis, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Thorne.
BENCH, Judge:
Barbara Soderborg (Wife) appeals the trial court's order
denying her alimony, attorney fees, and a share of David S.
Soderborg's (Husband) separate, nonmarital property in the
parties' divorce action.

Wife also challenges some of the

court's factual findings relating to that order.1

We affirm.

1. To the extent Wife challenges the trial court's findings
concerning Husband's income and whether the subject properties
were received as a gift or inheritance, we conclude that Wife has
failed to meet her marshaling burden. See Utah R. App. P.
24(a) (9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal
all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."); West
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (explaining marshaling requirement).

Wife clai ms that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to award her a share of the appreciated value of
Husband's separate, nonmarital property.

See Jensen v. Jensen,

2009 UT App 1, f 6, 203 P.3d 1020 ("A trial court has
considerable discretion concerning property division in a divorce
proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption of validity."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

"[A] spouse's separate

property and/or its appreciation, may be awarded in whole or in
part to the other spouse . . . where the nonowner spouse has
'contributed to the enhancement, maintenance or protection of
that property,' or [if] there are 'other extraordinary situations
where equity so demands.'"

Id. f 11 (quoting Mortensen v.

Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988)).2

" TAlctive

participation and contribution" is required for a nonowner spouse
to receive separate, nonmarital property under the contribution
category.

Id. ^| 14 (emphasis added) .

Here, Husband either inherited or was gifted two properties
from his father.

When Husband received them, the properties were

in violation of building codes and zoning ordinances and were
facing condemnation due to their severe states of disrepair.

For

2. Separate, nonmarital property may also be awarded to the
nonowner spouse if "the property has been consumed or its
identity lost through commingling," where the nonowner spouse is
granted an interest in the property, or in lieu of alimony or
attorney fees. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah
1988). Wife makes no such arguments on appeal.
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several years, Husband dedicated most of his time to repairing
these properties, transforming them from nearly-condemned "dumps"
to habitable, profitable rental properties.

Once the properties

could be used as rentals, Husband then dedicated most of his time
to operating and managing the rental properties.

Wife argues that Husband's labor, which transformed these
properties into profitable rental properties, is a marital asset,
thereby entitling her to a portion of the properties' appreciated
value.

However, Wife has not presented any evidence showing how

she directly "contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or
protection" of the properties, save a half-day of painting.
id. f 11.

See

In fact, the evidence shows that the properties were

improved through Husband's labors alone.

As Wife has failed to

show that she had any "active participation [with] or
contribution" to the properties, we conclude that she cannot
claim a portion of their value under the contribution theory for
granting separate, nonmarital property to the nonowner spouse.
See id. % 14.

Further, Wife has not adequately demonstrated that

this case presents an extraordinary situation where equity
demands division of Husband's separate, nonmarital property.

See

icL. H 11.

Wife next claims that the trial court made several erroneous
factual findings in support of its decision to deny her alimony.
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See Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, % 7, 76 P.3d 716 ("If

[an

appellate court] is charged with the task of reviewing the trial
court's findings of fact [in support of an alimony determination]
we will reverse only if the findings are clearly erroneous."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Wife argues that the trial

court should have awarded her alimony because she became disabled
following cancer treatment and cannot support herself by becoming
employed and producing her own income, save the $14 7 0 monthly
disability payment she receives from a private insurer.3

See

generally Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (a) (ii) (requiring trial
courts to consider "the recipient[ spouse's] earning capacity or
ability to produce income" in determining alimony).

At trial,

the only evidence Wife presented to prove her disability was her
own testimony and her monthly receipt of a disability check from
a private insurer.

Indeed, after testifying that her doctor had

not released her to work, Wife admitted on cross-examination that
she had not requested work release.

The trial court therefore

3. Concerning her ability to produce income, Wife argues that
her disability payments are her only source of income and any
assertion that she makes a substantial income from breeding dogs
is not supported by the evidence. We decline to address this
argument, however, because the trial court did not include any
profits Wife may have made from her dog breeding hobby in
calculating her yearly income. In fact, the court calculated
Wife's yearly income from her disability insurance "without
consideration of any additional income she may derive from her
dogs, the sale of puppies, or other ventures that she was engaged
in during the marriage." (Emphasis added.) Nor did the court
use any of Wife's profits from dog breeding as a basis for
imputing income. Rather, it appears that any evidence concerning
Wife's dog breeding hobby was used only to show that Wife had the
physical ability to work.

4

found Wife had failed to prove she could not become employed in
order to earn income and contribute to her own support, reasoning
that Wife had not presented any testimony from a medical doctor
that she could not work due to a disability.

The trial court also found that Husband did not have the
ability to pay alimony to Wife.

See generally id. § 30-3-

5(8) (a) (iii) (requiring trial courts to consider "the ability of
the payor spouse to provide support" in determining alimony).
Husband had been ordered to pay temporary alimony to Wife, and
the trial court found that Husband needed to work a second job to
meet this obligation.

The record also shows that Husband and

Wife were living beyond their means, both claiming expenses well
beyond their monthly incomes.4

Although these facts illustrate

that both parties need alimony to maintain their respective
lifestyles, see generally id. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i) (requiring trial
courts to consider "the financial condition and needs of the
recipient spouse" in determining alimony), these facts also
illustrate that neither party is able to pay alimony to the
other.

Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court's

findings were clearly erroneous.

See Davis, 2003 UT App 282,

f 7.

4. Wife claimed a monthly income of $1470 with expenses totaling
around $3500 while Husband claimed a monthly income of $1932 with
monthly expenses of $2 579, not including the temporary alimony
obligation.
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Finally, Wife claims that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying her attorney fees.

See Stonehocker v.

Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, % 10, 176 P.3d 476 ("[T]he decision
to award attorney fees . . . [is] within the trial court's sound
discretion." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The trial

court ordered that both parties pay their own attorney fees,
finding that neither party had the ability to pay for the other.
See id. ("[T]he trial court's . . . denial of attorney fees must
be based on evidence of the financial need of the receiving
spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the
reasonableness of the requested fees." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

In light of the facts concerning the parties' monthly

incomes and expenses, the trial court's decision to deny Wife
attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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